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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals ignore appellant's 
constitutional rights to due process under both the federal and state 
constitutions because the record in this case shows she was given no 
notice before the hearing of June 29, 1987 that the issue of entering 
a "no-contact order" would be heard at that time but was only advised 
by notice that she would have to show cause as to why she should not 
be held in contempt for violation of a prior court order dated 
February 19, 1980 which the notice said ordered that "you not contact 
the Defendant or members of his family" when in fact the order of 
February 19, 1980 did not so order? In other words, does a court 
violate one's constitutional rights by entering an order su sponte 
against a party litigant who is unaware that such an order is being 
considered prior to its entry? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals erroneously conclude that the 
order appellant sought to have modified due to a change of 
circumstances was the one entered on February 19, 1980 (which had no 
"no-contact" provision) rather than the one entered August 13, 1987 
which did have a "no-contact" provision? 
3. Did the Court of Appeals err in ignoring appellant's 
citation to the provisions of Sec. 78-27-56 U.C.A. 1953 in its 
decision that "We can find no other basis for an award of attorneys 
fees under the circumstances of this case and appellant has indicated 
none" (page 4) (underscoring added) when that section was cited by 
appellant twice in her Docketing Statement (see paragraph No. 5(4) 
and also paragraph Noe 7)? 
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REPORTS OF OPINION 
The subject decision has not been published and the Court of 
Appeals has directed that it not be published. A copy of the 
decision is No. 1 of the Appendix. 
JURISDICTION 
1. Jurisdiction of this court is invoked on the basis of 
Sec. 78-2-2(5) U.C.A. 1953. 
2. The decision sought to be reviewed was entered on 
January 6, 1988. 
3. An extension of time for seven days to file this 
petition was entered on February 8, 1988. 
4. See No. 1 as for Rule 46(a) 5(D) of R. Utah S. Ct. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF EXPRESS LAW 
Fourteenth Amendment to Constitution of United States 
Article 1, Sec. 7 of Constitution of Utah 
Sec. 78-23-1 U.C.A. 1953 
Sec. 78-27-56 U.C.A. 1953 
Sec. 78-45A-1 et sec. U.C.A. 1953. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The subject proceedings were contempt proceeds growing out 
of a paternity suit in which the appellant was served an order to 
show cause on June 29, 1987 as to why she should not be held in 
contempt of court for writing letters to respondent concerning the 
emotional welfare of their son who was born out of wedlock and whose 
paternity was never admitted or judicially established. Appellant 
2 
appeared b^ counsel md pointed nti K * he court t.bat no Mno-contact" 
order har ^^ » '^en ^-H^ *.v * i-u* rial c^nr* whir = ^*! ->njv approved 
dirt which did contain a "no-contact" covenant 'the duration >t 
h«r order JD question, Fn^ -..ouri found ih^t appellant was ooi In 
contempt of court h.)» entered o order sua spont^ several days later 
nun Augui- 11 li H,>I>^II.J-' t na r the court was 
considering such *;, i \ • Appellant then moved for a dismissal of 
i 'Mtiiitl ] f h a t rebpt-u-.' - - - • t : a n , M ^ 
dismissa. *;».. prejudice that the subject order directed and 
ilternativ^iv t r - * •• amending rb* n- -contact" order of August 
i. ui* JJS since ne Luciraci 
* r- approver - v r it sebruary 1980 and trie time of the 
•»' ' ^ M i on
 e The 
tridj j-o;, o-t i-'. * . M tun: * appeal to i le Court of Appeals 
resulted *«. L:U. decision herein petitioned to be reviewede 
FACTS 
The single most: important tao. is that: the District Court of 
S a l t L.-3K - •• J -. • -. .- ;i ' i l ; ; ; » O i , - u t 
respondent priot io respondent commencing the contempt proceedings 
which began hv ru order to show ^ause daffi Mav i1"*, ]98? (no citation 
i rill i /' . - • i • - ». J J'T- *.' * * l ') .t'^-ii , •'--
The c l o s e s t oJie may come co :io so in t h i s i n s t ance i s to note t h a t 
the t r i a l j ( ^ - : f ! "^ u-.i- -, n: P - - i-iru- ' ;^H~ *.itef> Iher^ MJp^rs 
to be confusion, about whether an order e x i s t s " , , Appendix No, 3*).. 
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The second most important fact is that the order to show 
cause of May 15, 1987, did not give appellant notice that an order of 
"no-contact" would be sought on June 29, 1987 as a result of the 
hearing that date (Appendix No* 2). The Court of Appeals said that 
appellant had notice. She did but it is not sufficient that she had 
any notice but notice as to the precise question as to whether a 
"no-contact" order was to be entered thereafter. 
The third most important fact is that the court order of 
August 13, 1987 was made sua sponte and without notice to appellant 
(again the lack of notice is a fact which can not be pinpointed as it 
is a negative fact). 
The fourth most important fact is that a young child is in 
emotional distress and the appellant mother should not be precluded 
from seeking to relieve the same in any lawful manner that she can 
(Appendix No. 7). 
The final critical fact as to Sec. 78-27-56 U.C.A. 1953 is 
that initial contempt order was without merit and not brought or 
asserted in good faith (based on fact "first" above). 
ARGUMENT 
As to the first issue (due process), the Court of Appeals 
has sanctioned such a departure by the District Court as to call for 
an exercise of this Court's power of supervision. Thus the 
application of Rule 43(3) R. Utah S. Ct. requires that granting of 
this petition as the record is clear that appellant did not have any 
notice that the court would be asked to enter a "no-contact" order 
more than seven years after the court made an order directing 
4 
respondent to cause the paternity action to be dismissed with 
p r e j i i d I c e 1 i p o n p a yme n t o r t ha t t lie c o t i r t: w o i i ] d d o s o s i i*i s p 0 n. t e 
without: notl ce * Due process is --,0 fundamental to our entire system. 
of jurisprudence that no argument is deemed necessarv i persuade 
I) ta b s h 1 g 11 e s 1 1 o1ir 1 I o 1 • • • • nus i 1 d H I 1" w i I 11 1 : • -
As to the second issue (change of circumstances) the '.'.our? 
' \Dpeal- leoarted so far from a
 c o r r e c t understanding -t ? -n tnrrs 
:.c/ :t *~^uorX appellant sought to amend the order of: February ] y v 
1980 since -. ^af.ed OP D^-VV \ c: its ^cision "v vhe threshold 
1 . '. • Igment 
susceptible ot mod if 'icat ion.." Appellants entire argument has always 
5 e e n that the order of that date contal ned no "no -contact" 
provision. In i ts entirety that order provided is tollows: 
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 1. The 
foregoing Agreement of Settlement is hereby 
approved. 2. This matter is stricken from the 
trial calendar and continued with date. 3. The 
defendant shall submit to the Court an Order of 
dismissal upon final payment of the amounts 
referred to in the foregoing Agreement of 
Settlement*" 
"no-contact orde/ * JJUO*USI 1 *. I M / ~ M>. * 1 misconception of t ho 
facts cal1« -^r this Court's power of Supervision referred to in Rule 
*° 
A.s to the third issue (attorneys fees) the question as to 
whether or not a •. t y i « p m f,i I a* ! to attorneys fees for defending 
against violation on a nun existing court order has never been, 
5 
settled by this Court and it should be settled pursuant to Rule 43(4) 
Re Utah S. Ct. 
CONCLUSION 
For reasons set forth above petitioner respectfully submits 
that this petition should be granted as the case is uniquely 
significant and if sua sponte orders may be made in such cases the 
bar should be so advised. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of February, 1988. 5 th£
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Filed by Appellant to 
Robert Felton, Attorney at Law, 5 Triad Center, Suite 585, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84180 on this 16th day of February, 1988. 
n^/3 %bu*^ 
Robert B. Hansen 
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F I L E D 
JAN 61S88 
wi«rk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEAL* 
™«„oo0oo— 
Kathy Ann Oopp, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Jonathan OIrh, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Before Judges Davidson-. Sdifl rt'iti •iccnnwood (On I..»JW and Motion) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not for Publication) 
Cas^ No. 870572-CA 
PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary 
Disposition of appellant Kathy Ann Dopp (hereinafter "Dopp") 
and on the Motion for Summary Disposition and Response of 
respondent Jonathan Olch (hereinafter "Olch"). We grant the 
motion made by Olch and summarily affirm the trial court's 
order. 
Dopp filed a paternity proceeding alleging that Olch was 
the father of her child. Olch disputed the allegations of 
paternity. In February of 1980, Olch and Dopp, individually 
and "as guardian ad litemM for her child, entered into a 
stipulation for settlement which provided for a lump sum 
settlement of all claims as to paternity, expenses of 
pregnancy, any education and support expenses, inheritance 
rights and any claim otherwise related to the allegations of 
the pleadings or subject matter of the litigation. The 
settlement agreement contained an express disclaimer of 
paternity and a waiver of any rights to the child. Finally, 
the agreement contained the following language regarding 
disposition of the 1 itigation: 
5. "Both parties agree not to initiate 
any communications with the other party oi 
members of their family," 
6. "The parties agree that upon the 
payment of the entire $16,500.00 and any 
accrued interest, the above-entitled 
action shall be dismissed with prejudice 
and upon the merits, each party to bear 
his or her own costs." 
7. -This agreement is conditioned upon 
the approval of the court where the 
above-entitled action is pending and a 
dismissal with prejudice of said action." 
The document also contained an -Order- which recited that the 
court approved the Agreement of Settlement, and that the matter 
was continued without date. The Order further provided, "The 
defendant shall submit to the court an Order of Dismissal upon 
final payment of the amounts referred to in the foregoing 
Agreement of Settlement." The Order was signed on February 19, 
1980 and filed on the same date. 
On January 27, 1981, Dopp's counsel filed a Satisfaction of 
Judgment acknowledging receipt of the settlement amount and 
authorizing and directing the court to enter satisfaction. 
Although not conforming with the express direction of the 
February 19, 1980 Order to prepare an Order of Dismissal, the 
Satisfaction of Judgment was clearly intended to culminate the 
paternity action. 
In or about June of 1987, Olch caused an Order to Show 
Cause to be issued requiring Dopp to appear and show why she 
should not be held in contempt for initiating communication 
with Olch and his family. The court declined to hold Dopp in 
contempt, but ordered that 
It was the intent of the parties that no 
communication be instigated between them 
or their families and the court now enters 
this Order that neither party shall 
communicate with the other or their 
families in any way, whether such 
communication be written or verbal, or 
through utilizing third parties. 
Dopp subsequently brought a Motion to Dismiss with 
Prejudice and in the alternative, a Motion to Amend Decree to 
allow for communication between the minor child, Olch and his 
family. Both motions were denied. Dopp appeals, contending 
that the trial court erred in -sui sponte- entering an order of 
870572-CA 2 
no communication, in refusing to dismiss the case, in not 
amending the "decree" based on "changed circumstances", and in 
denying appellant attorney fees. 
The Utah Uniform Act on Paternity establishes that the 
father of a child born out of wedlock is liable to the same 
extent as the father of child born in wedlock "for the 
reasonable expense of the mother's pregnancy and confinement 
and for the education, necessary support and funeral expenses 
of the child** Utah Code Ann, § 78-45a^l (1987). Utah Code 
Ann, § 78-45a-2 (1987) prescribes the means for enforcement of 
the father's obligation "[i]f paternity has been determined or 
has been acknowledged according to the laws of this state." 
"The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify or revoke a 
judgment for future education and necessary support." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45a-5 (1987). "An agreement of settlement with 
the alleged father is binding only when approved by the 
court," Utah Code Ann. § 78~45a-13 (1987). 
Dopp's first contention on appeal is that the trial court 
erred in "sui sponte" entering an order prohibiting her and her 
child from communicating with Olch and his family. This 
argument is wholly without merit. Dopp received notice of the 
hearing on the order to show cause, appeared at the hearing and 
was represented by counsel. The court declined to find Dopp in 
contempt, but reiterated the provision of the settlement 
approved by the court precluding communication between the 
parties or their families. 
Dopp next claims that the trial court erred In refusing to 
amend the "decree" based on "changed circumstances" consisting 
of the emotional problems of the child. This argument 
misconstrues the effect of the order of the court approving the 
settlement reached between Dopp and Olch. The Utah Uniform Act 
on Paternity provides for continuing jurisdiction to modify or 
revoke a judgment for future education and necessary support. 
See Utah Code Ann. 78-45a-5. The threshold determination is 
whether the February 19, 1980 Order is a judgment susceptible 
of modification. The Order approves a lump sum settlement of a 
disputed paternity action between Dopp and Olch. The Order 
does not contain any provision for future support nor does it 
establish the paternity of the child. The Order is not a 
870572-CA 3 
judgment susceptible of modification under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45a-5.1 
Dopp also appeals from the denial of an award of attorney 
fees to her. The Utah Uniform Act on Paternity contains no 
provision authorizing an award of attorneys fees in paternity 
actions. We can find no other basis for an award of attorney 
fees under the circumstances of this case and the appellant has 
indicated none. 
Finally, Dopp contends that the trial court erred in 
refusing to dismiss the case. The Stipulation for Settlement 
and the Order approving the settlement each provide that upon 
payment of the settlement amount, Olch shall cause the case to 
be dismissed with prejudice. Rather than prepare a dismissal, 
counsel for Olch prepared a Satisfaction of Judgment, with the 
apparent intention to culminate the litigation between the 
parties insofar as the financial aspects of the settlement 
1. We do not have before us in this case the issue of whether 
the parties could validly waive the child's right to support, 
and we, therefore, decline to rule upon the effect of an order 
approving a settlement of the support rights of the minor 
child. The Utah Supreme Court ruled in Huck v. Huck. 734 P.2d 
417, 419 (1986), that the parents of a child could not, by 
agreement, waive that child's right to support. See also Reick 
v. Reick, 652 P.2d 916, 917 (Utah 1982); Strong v. Strong. 548 
P.2d 626, 627-28 (Utah 1976). Our determination does not 
require a resolution of that issue. Instead, our holding that 
the present Order does not invoke the trial court's continuing 
jurisdiction is based on the literal terms of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45a-5 providing that continuing jurisdiction is dependent 
upon the existence of a judgment for future support. Similarly, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-2, referring to enforcement of the 
liabilities of the father of a child born out of wedlock, 
requires a determination that a parental relationship exists 
under the laws of this state. The February 1980 order approving 
the settlement satisfies neither of those prerequisites. The 
Order makes no determination of paternity and contains no 
judgment for future support. Similarly, although Dopp 
purportedly entered the settlement as guardian ad litem of her 
child, this Court does not have before it and makes no 
determination of the effect of the order on any future action by 
or on behalf of the child to adjudicate paternity and establish 
the right to support. 
870572-CA 4 
between Dopp and Olch are concerned. Appellant's motion before 
the trial court sought relief in the alternatives either an 
order dismissing the case with prejudice or an order amending 
the "decree" to modify the non-communication provision* The 
strategy suggests that Dopp believes the dismissal of the case 
would nullify the non-communication agreement * That contention 
is erroneous. The settlement, having been approved by the 
trial court, is binding upon the parties and the 
non-communication clause is subject to enforcement by the trial 
courtc Dismissal of the case, although contemplated by the 
February 1980 Order, would not relieve Dopp and Olch of the 
requirements of their settlement, particularly where Olch has 
paid the amount set forth in the agreement* 
The Order of the to al court is affirmed. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Richard C' Davidson,, Judge 
Regnal W Garff, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
870572-CA 5 
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TO: Kathy Ann Dopp 
You are hereby ordered unit i »<i w I i «J »t i n 11 |i IP »• a r |M l o r e M b » » 
Honorable ^^^-5 1 \*iv«y\% Judge of the above-entitled court *>. 
240 East 4th South, Salt Lake City, Utah ou the J1' i> / day of-M-e-y, 
198 TLlQQ p^) e
 K j 1K 1, then !and there 
cause why you should not be found in contempt of this Court for 
violating the Order entered 
demanding that you not contact the Defendant or members of h1u 
family. 
Y o u H 1 H HI I  11 mi I iii i t In IP - * "• • I 1 i1 ill 1 in II |! | H J ci i' .«n mi ml H h o w ' c a u s e w h y 
you should nor, In? ordered assume and pay the Defendant's legal 
fees for the prosecution of this action a 1 < 1 w II 1 3 t:l:i::i s cou 1: t shc uJ I 
not take the other action requested i n tin Verified Motion filed 
by the Defendant, including the posting of a bond to ensure 
future compli anc e with t h 1 s Courtfs 0rder . 
DATED this ir' day of V*\>rjiny, 1987 . 
Serve Hit Defendant at?' 
Pavt# f" -t it * t. 
County of Salt Lake - State of Utah 
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* * * * * * * * * 
ORDER 
Civil Noo C-786634 
Judge James S« Sawaya 
This matter ca^f* r. M t >M hearing betoce the hoh-.u^r- , .- . i , . 
S. S * . -j . idge ot , v.* j^ove-entitUd pour f on June 29, iVri; 
p ii r-iti-jnt . let • > ^ t, , w * * u s e M I • -1 t j t h e D • - f e o -J -t ; c 
ias o n * i J *: r. ti r e i t; a I- .J 
f o r g o o •! C d u s « j a p p e a r in g i» u w t i m e r s i i J i > ') r d *- - a a t o 1 l o w s : 
^ • i r i d i a t i U JLb n u t i n c L r - is 
? . T f T^aa t-Vio I n t e n t o f t ie ijaiti^.; M M ' O»> c o m m u n i c a t i o n 
K
-e i n s t i g a t e d b e t w e e n t h e m ->r t h e i r f a m i l i e s a n d t h e C o u r t n o w 
<: ;i t- r - '• • - - r p a r t y sit - • » c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h t h e 
<»t h e r t., r r. h e , : .- a ?• * I I .>
 f t -( iny ^ a y r whether su c n c •, -u m u n 1 c a t to n b e 
written or verbal, or through utilizing tnira
 vi 
x
 «->-' day of J^tra^fcy, 1987 . DATED t .his 
Jame^I Sawaya , J-rfclge 
ATTEST 
H. OIXOH Hii\I5LEY 
Depjoi|y Cia 
p.,PMn /"ZT-JtZfS 
"ITLE: (^ PARTIES PRESENT) COUNSEL: (* COUNSEL PRESENT) 
?{#&^M4>t*1 d2!#fZf /^y^y /s>. A/*^*^ 
/ 
_/^U/J ^^tf ^ g ^ ^ ^ W ^ ^ ^ 
CLERK HON 




/ ' *^0 f£6a*#u6<><? z/^&£4j^t^u, <^c<^ ^ZL 
0, ^O £*ufZ*s^/ /J^/J^^. — szl^^J-^ 
3\ CZ/) ^J^/^^^yJZi^e^J 
*^C&* &2? 
~~ ^rtf*?/!^ • 
/j//ys& J&Y*-^,***' u*-7 /££-t^z^^^-z> ~^> <**&cc 
£^^2-^6*o /~2> 
Robert B. Hansen A-1344 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 322-5804 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
KATHY ANN DOPP, : DOCKETING STATEMENT 
(Subject to assignment to 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : the Court of Appeals) 
vs. : Civil No. 87-0398 
JONATHAN OLCH, : 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
Comes now the plaintiff/appellant and pursuant to Rule 9 of 
Rules of Utah Supreme Court submits the following Docketing 
Statement: 
1. Authority 
Sec. 78-2a<-3(g) U.C.A. 1953 confers jurisdiciton on Utah 
Court of Appeals to hear this appeal (notice of appeal was to that 
court but sent to this one by Salt Lake County Clerk as filing fee 
check was made to this court). 
2. Nature of Proceeding 
This is an appeal from a final order of the district court 
in a post judgment paternity case. 
3. Dates 
(a) Date of judgment to be reviewed: August 13, 1987. 
(b) Date of Notice of Appeal: October 12, 1987 (appeal time 
having been extended by minute order dated September 30, 1987 until 
October 13, 1987). 
4. Statement of Facts 
In 1978 plaintiff Dopp bore a son out of wedlock and brought 
this action for naternity. The case was settled by defendant Olch 
agreeing to pay -fl5,000.00 over a period of time. The agreement 
provided that Dopp was not to contact Olch or his family directly or 
indirectly. It also provided that upon payment of the agreed upon 
settlement sum Olch was to cause the case to be dismissed. The 
payment agreed to was made. The case was not dismissed. The child 
in question developed emotional problems and Dopp wrote several 
letters to Olch seeking his help concerning his son's problems (Dopp 
knows its his child although he has denied it legally and the issue 
was never litigated). Olch caused an order to be served upon Dopp to 
show cause why she should not be held in contempt for writing those 
letters. Dopp appeared by counsel and showed cause that contempt 
would not lie because the lower court had not made any order 
prohibiting such letters (the court had only approved the contract). 
The trial judge found here was no contempt and denied Olch's request 
for attorneys fees. Sui sponte he ordered Dopp not to contact Olch 
or his family in the future. Dopp moved to dismiss the case in its 
entirety on the grounds that the case should long since have been 
dismissed had Olch complied with the agreement of the parties and 
alternatively a change of circumstance regarding the boy justified 
the elimination of any no contact provision and the substitution of a 
lesser restriction. The Court denied Dopp's motions and this appeal 
challenges the validity of the order prohibiting any contact. 
5e Issues on Appeal 
(1) Whether the lower court erred in making the order sui 
sponte and thereby depriving appellant of reasonable notice and 
opportunity to be heard. 
(2) Whether the lower court erred in not determining that 
the parties (and the District Court) intended that the case in its 
entirety should be dismissed upon payment of the agreed sum and is 
not dismissing the suit when appellant moved to do so. 
(3) Whether the lower court erred in not amending the 
decree due to changed circumstances, 
(4) Whether this Court should award attorneys fees to 
appellant pursuant to Sec. 78-27-56. 
6. Assignment 
This is a paternity case and should be assigned to the Court 
of Appeals (see No. 1 above). 
7. Determinative Law 
Sec. 78-32-1 and Sec. 78-27-56 U.C.A. 1953. 
8. Prior or Related Appeals! 
There are no prior or related appeals. 
9. Attachments 
(1) Minutes, 6-30-87 
(2) Order, 8-13-87 
(3) Motions, 8-13-87 
(4) Minutes, 9-30-87 
(5) Order Denying Mot ion^or i u pyutf So N^T ATT*^fett\ 
(6) Notice of Appeal, 10-12-87 ' 
Dated this 3rd day of November, 1987. 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Docketing Statement to Robert Felton, Attorney at Law, 5 
Triad Center, Suite 585, Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 on this **4 day 
of November, 1987. *^-v 
Robert B. Hansen 
UTAH PSYCHOLO^fCAI^ENTER INC 
3970 SOUTTiSo^eAST^*^^^ SUITE 12 
SALT LAKE C^fa UTAH S4107 
(801) 263-0600 
August 28, 1987 
MALCOLM N„ LIEBROOER, Ph.D, 
BARBARA T LIEBROOER, Ph.D, 
Jonathan Olch 
3087 American Saddler Dr. 
Park City, UT 84068 
Dear Mr. Olch: 
I recently had the opportunity to interview Alister Dopp and to 
review some school records and teacher's reports pertaining to him. 
This work had been done at the request of Alister1s mother who was 
concerned about her son's adjustment. 
Although there is much data to indicate that Alister is extremely 
bright and creative, it was also evident that he is a rather lonely 
child who has had difficulty relating well with others. Both in and 
away from school he has had no close friends and he finds it difficult 
to cope appropriately with the usual kinds of teasing most youngsters 
learn to accept. Despite his excellent vocabulary, Alister avoided 
talking about his thoughts and feelings openly and directly. 
Although Alister would benefit from some counseling, he is sorely 
in need of the type of experiences that could be provided by family 
members including you and his paternal grandparents. Not only would 
such contacts add to his sense of identity but they could help him 
become a more open, trusting person capable of having close 
relationships. I 
Alister1s mother has made me somewhat aware of the restrictions 
which have existed in terms of such contacts, but I am concerned that 
unless some consideration is given to his current needs, his future 
looks bleak. I would appreciate it if you would let me know if you are 
willing to be of help to this child and hope for a response from the 
other family members to whom I'm writing. 
Sincerely, 
Malcolm N. Liebroder, Ph.D. 
Clinical Psychologist 
MNL/be 
cc: Mr. and Mrs. Gordon Olch 
Mr. and Mrs. Brad and Alice Olch 
Kathy Dopp 
Robert B. Hansen, Esq. 
